Philosophy of mind Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Philosophy of mind - Essay simulationSummary of Searles Claim Searles (1980) reply to the query Could a machine think? is strengthened on two propositions, which he stated as follows (1) Intentionality in clement beings (and animals) is a product of causative features of the brain. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. Searle explains that the strict transp bent consequence of his prototypal two propositions is (3) the explanation that the manner by which the brain establishs intentionality invalidates the claim that intentionality is also produced by instantiating a computer program. Hence, a computer program can non produce intentionality. He furthers that the trivial consequence of his first proposition is (4) the need to possess causal powers similar with those of the brain to enable any mechanism to produce intentionality. Hence, a machine should have a human-like brain to be able to think. Lastly, he explains t hat what follows to his propositions 2 and 4 is the proposition (5) that any literal attempt to create intentionality through artificial way would fail to do so if it will only design programs like the AI what it needs to succeed is to recreate the human brains causal powers. ... Hence proposition (1) can be stated as human beings have intentionality because they have the causal powers of the brain. This way of saying it is to state Searles argument in other way that intentionality is the kind activity that human beings are capable of doing because of the causal powers of the human brain that they biologically possess for a machine to think it must have intentionality which can only be doable through having the causal powers of the brain. Hence, non unless the machine has the causal powers of the brain similar to human beings, the machine could not think. Thus, to say that AI, as what functionalism and computationalism persistently assert, can fully think with the understandin g that thinking here has intentionality is inadequate of saying that AI can also be human beings a claim that obviously Searle does not want to accept, rejecting every possibility that AI could think and consistently defending his position that intentionality is a mental characteristic inherent to human beings. Actually, AIs claim seems harmless, but perhaps Searle has perceived its touch-and-go implication thats why he obstinately opposes it. Hence on his part, Searle simplifies his proposition (1) in a way that does not allow an AI to become capable of thinking certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality (p. 417). Searles way of simplifying his proposition (1) is to emphasize his point that intentionality requires necessary causal features of the brain that is cold more than the information processing system that computationalism is so proud of or the formal symbol handling of functionalism, because these causal features of the brain are in fact